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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM
HE unrestrained growth of business and industry that defined the
1980s has ended, and the early 1990s have represented recession and
a tightening of the corporate beltstrap. Not only has business been
affected, forced into breakups and mergers, but the law firm philosophy has
also undergone significant cognitive revision. The forced down-sizing of
firms has required a substantial number of attorneys to relocate, transferring
to other firms or practicing individually.' The shifting of lawyers in con-
junction with the reorganization of many corporate clients creates a consid-
1. See Keith D. Spickelmier & Kenric Kattner, Client, Attorney Mobility Creates Grow-
ing Conflict of Interest Concerns, 53 TEX. B.J. 406, 406 (1990).
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erable risk that attorneys may take on cases where they represent interests
adverse to those of a former client.2
While representations adverse to a former client are typically not com-
pletely forbidden,3 both attorneys and their clients often prefer to avoid
these situations for reasons ranging from the fear of disclosed confidences, to
the desire to keep the integrity of the legal profession intact, or to the at-
tempt to maintain a fair trial.4 The most immediate way to address a con-
flict of interest problem in litigation is by submitting a motion to disqualify
to the court.5
Such a motion can have quite drastic effects on the lawsuit. The mere
submission of a motion to disqualify will be expensive to the clients in both
time and money. 6 Furthermore, in the case of a ruling for disqualification,
the client will be deprived of the attorney of his choice and will also lose all
of the work that his lawyer had already prepared. 7 The disqualified attorney
faces losing a substantial amount of effort as well as the fees which would
have been received had his representation continued. Moreover, his profes-
sional reputation may suffer, and he may even face an ethical investigation. 8
Also, through the principle of imputed disqualification, the entire law firm,
including all of its offices in every state, risk being similarly disqualified. 9
In recent years, the rules that attorneys use as guidelines when presented
with the problem of representing interests adverse to a former client have
2. Accord id. For example, as many as nine partners left due to client conflicts after the
merger of Chicago's Winston & Strawn with D.C.'s Bishop, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds. Diane
E. Ambler, Lateral Hiring Conflicts, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus. INSIGHTS, June 1991, at 7
n. 1.
3. See, e.g., Harry H. Schneider, Jr., An Invitation to Malpractice. Ignoring Conflict-of-
Interest Rules Can Open Pandora's Box, 78 A.B.A. J. 104, 104 (Nov. 1992).
4. For further discussion of these and other reasons, see both the ethical and procedural
considerations infra at n6tes 28 to 42 and accompanying text.
5. See Harva Ruth Dockery, Note, Motions to Disqualify Counsel Representing an Inter-
est Adverse to a Former Client, 57 TEX. L. REV. 726, 726 n.2 (1979). "Disqualification is the
administrative remedy a court uses when it orders an attorney to withdraw from a case. It is
not a civil remedy or a disciplinary action." Id.; see also Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for
Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 917-21 (1955).
6. Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1244, 1486-96 (1981) [hereinafter Developments-Conflicts] (stating not only will the
court's attention be drawn away from the merits of the case, but the clients will be billed for
the time spent arguing the motion).
7. See Spickelmier & Kattner, supra note 1, at 406.
8. See Dockery, supra note 5, at 741.
9. See Dockery, supra note 5, at 741 n.80. In Texas, the presumption that all confidences
with a former client are shared amongst the entire firm is irrebuttable. Petroleum Wholesale,
Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). Other jurisdictions,
and some federal courts, will allow as a defense a screening device known as a "Chinese Wall."
See generally Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA.
L. REV. 677 (1980).
Disqualifying the associates of a disqualified attorney ... may impede the for-
mation of new firms, the growth of existing firms, and the mobility of attorneys.
In addition vicarious disqualification may discourage specialization since many
specialists have limited clientele. [Thus] [t]he risk of disqualification severely
limits the number of potential clients for both the individual attorney and his
entire firm.
Dockery, supra note 5, at 741 n.80.
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been subjected to numerous changes. Because the dust from past revisions
has only just begun to settle and the winds of change, blowing from un-
resolved dilemmas, have again begun to stir, this comment will attempt to
explain the current conditions that govern courts' determinations of disqual-
ification motions and also give an accurate forecast of the future.
B. SCOPE
In many instances, the propriety of an attorney's representation of a given
client is questionable, and a party will entertain a motion to disqualify the
opposing counsel. This comment will focus solely on those problems that
arise in civil litigation due to conflicts of interest created by an attorney rep-
resenting interests adverse to a former client. These conflicts of interest are
often labeled "successive conflicts of interest" as opposed to "concurrent
conflicts of interest" which arise when a law firm attempts to represent two
clients at the same time who may have different interests.' 0 Determinations
of the existence of successive conflicts and concurrent conflicts are governed
by different standards, the latter being a much more stringent standard. I I
The scope of this comment does not encompass attorney disqualifications in
the criminal context; those, too, have a different, more restrictive standard.' 2
The analysis of the law as it relates to motions to disqualify for successive
conflicts of interest will focus primarily on the law as it is applied in Texas
and the Fifth Circuit. The first section examines the ethical standards that
govern an attorney's decision to oppose a former client. Thereafter, this
comment addresses the court's authority to order a disqualification. Next,
the reasons to use a motion to disqualify during a lawsuit rather than an-
other remedy are considered. The manner in which disqualification motions
are treated by courts with regard for the most recent court cases will also be
addressed. Finally, some recalcitrant problems that occur in determining
whether to disqualify an attorney for a conflict of interest with a former
client will be examined.
10. Spickelmier & Kattner, supra note 1, at 406-07.
11. Id.
An analysis of [a concurrent conflict] is simple. Clearly, a lawyer may not ac-
cept representation adverse to a present client. An analysis of [a successive con-
flict] is based upon the premise that the lawyer received confidential information
regarding the former client that could be utilized to the former client's detri-
ment when representing interests adverse to the former client. The relative in-
quiry in the successive conflict context is to compare the substance of the prior
representation to the substance of the present adverse representation.
Id. at 407; see Gregory L. Allen, Comment, Texas Finally Adopts a Standard by Which to
Govern Former Client Conflicts of Interest: Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.09, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 737, 737 n.4 (1990). Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY R.
PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 (1993), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app.
(Vernon Supp. 1993) [hereinafter TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT] (governing succes-
sive conflicts) with TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.06 (1993) (governing concurrent
conflicts).
12. See Dockery, supra note 5, at 726 n.1.
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II. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In Texas, the ethical rules 13 articulate the circumstances in which an at-
torney should not represent an interest adverse to a former client.
14
Although this comment addresses successive conflicts of interest as a basis
for attorney disqualification rather than ethical sanctioning, the considera-
tions have become so intertwined that an understanding of the relevant ethi-
cal principles is nonetheless required.' 5 The reason for this complex
interrelationship is that Texas has no rule governing when an attorney
should be disqualified for representing an interest adverse to a former client.
The ethical rules, however, do provide a standard for judging whether the
representation is proper. So, despite the fact that ethical rules are not proce-
dural guidelines, their standards, which are couched in terms of how a rea-
sonable attorney properly conducts himself, have a great impact on the
determination of whether a representation is unreasonable, and thus should
result in a disqualification.
A. HISTORY
Although the ethical behavior of lawyers is largely self-governing, 16 the
Supreme Court of Texas has the authority to oversee the practice of law and
insure the proper administration of justice,17 and the State Bar administrates
the rules of the judicial branch.' 8 Until 1990, the standards of attorney con-
duct in Texas were set by a code of professional responsibility based, like
most other states, on a model code.19 The Codes were made up of canons,
ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules, varying in authority from
mandatory to aspirational. 20 This trifurcated format was very difficult for
attorneys to understand and to use as a gauge for determining appropriate
behavior. 2 1
13. On January 1, 1990, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct replaced
the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT
(1993); Supreme Court of Texas, Code of Prof. Responsibility (1988). The new Texas Rules,
although amended by the Texas State Bar, are based on the ABA's 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. See MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT (1983); W. Frank Newton, The Pro-
posed Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Should be Adopted, 52 TEX. B.J. 557, 557
(1989).
14. The rule is entitled "Conflict of Interest: Former Client." TEX. DISCIPLINARY R.
PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 (1993). Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules is not materially different
from its Texas counterpart. See In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1992). Compare MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.9 (1983)
with TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 (1993).
15. See Dockery, supra note 5, at 729-30.
16. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT preamble 9 (1993); Newton, supra note 13,
at 557; see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT preamble 11 (stating "Compliance
with the rules ... depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance").
17. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 81.011-.012 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
18. Newton, supra note 13, at 557.
19. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the American
Bar Association in 1969. The Texas Code, adapted from the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, was adopted in 1971. See Supreme Court of Texas, Code of Prof. Responsibil-
ity (1988); Members Vote for Bar Rule Changes, 34 TEX. B.J. 1052, 1052 (1971).
20. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1980).
21. See Allen, supra note 11, at 740; Newton, supra note 13, at 559.
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B. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
In 1990, Texas promulgated a set of new rules to establish proper conduct
for attorneys which are entitled the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct.22 One of the overriding causes for the change was to make the
rules easier to understand.23 Instead of combining aspirational and
mandatory rules, the Texas Disciplinary Rules consist only of rules, all of
which are mandatory. 24 The Rules are intended as standards "for [the] pur-
poses of professional discipline."' 25 They make no attempt, nor were they
intended, to suggest penalties or disciplinary procedures for their violation. 26
Similarly, they neither make a legal duty nor create civil liability for
lawyers. 27
C. TEXAS RULE 1.0928
Before the advent of the Texas Disciplinary Rules, no one rule specifically
protected the interests of clients who had to face their former attorney in an
adverse situation.29 The duty to avoid a successive conflict of interest was
expressed in conjunction with three different ethical rules. 30 The code provi-
sions were the duty of confidentiality (which continues even beyond termina-
tion of representation), 3 1 the duty to exercise independent judgment on
behalf of the client, 32 and the duty to avoid even the appearance of impropri-
ety. 33 The lack of a clear rule devoted to the subject of former client con-
flicts resulted in uncertainty, thus Rule 1.09 was crafted to fill the void. 34
The rule is based in part on the model rule, but includes significant altera-
tions.35 Texas rule 1.09, entitled "Conflict of Interest: Former Client," reads
22. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT (1993).
23. John F. Sutton & W. Frank Newton, Proposed Texas Disciplinary Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct: Commonly Asked Questions, 52 TEX. B.J. 561, 562 (1989).
24. Id. "By promulgating only rules, the Texas Disciplinary Rules constitute a substan-
tial improvement over the Code because they clarify the boundaries of permissive conduct that
were unclear under the former standard." Allen, supra note 11, at 740. Aspirational guide-
lines are still present in the form of comments, which aid interpretation of the rules and are
purely advisory. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT preamble 10 (1990).
25. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT preamble 10 (1990).
26. Id. 14-15.
27. Id.; see also Sutton & Newton, supra note 23, at 562 (explaining that the rules are
"substantive law for disciplinary proceedings" [emphasis added]).
28. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 (1993).
29. Robert P. Schuwerk & John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, 27A Hous. L. REV. 1, 146 (1990).
30. Dockery, supra note 5, at 728.
31. See MODEL CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101 (1980).
32. See MODEL CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-107 (1980).
33. See MODEL CODE OF PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-101 (1980).
34. See generally Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 29, at 147-48 (providing an exhaustive
analysis of Rule 1.09, as well as, each of the other rules, published when the Texas Disciplinary
Rules were first promulgated and filling an entire volume).
35. Model Rule 1.9 reads:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereaf-
ter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substan-
1994]
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as follows:
(a) Without prior consent, a lawyer who personally has formerly repre-
sented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person
in a matter adverse to the former client:
(1) in which such other person questions the validity of the lawyer's
services or work product for the former client; or
(2) if the representation in reasonable probability will involve a viola-
tion of Rule 1.05 [which protects present and former client confidential-
ity] [;]
(3) if it is the same or a substantially related matter. 36
The Rule also extends the prohibition of paragraph (a) to all of the mem-
bers of a law firm:
(b) Except to the extent authorized by Rule 1.10 [the rule for former
government employees], when lawyers are or have become members of
or associated with a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client if any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from
doing so by paragraph (a). 37
The treatment of all lawyers in a firm as one for purposes of creating a con-
flict of interest is often called the principle of imputed disqualification or
vicarious disqualification.
The Rule also addresses what representations are improper even after law-
yers leave:
(c) When the association of a lawyer with a firm has terminated, the
lawyers who were then associated with that lawyer shall not knowingly
represent a client if the lawyer whose association with that firm has
terminated would be prohibited from doing so by paragraph (a)(1) or if
the representation in reasonable probability will involve a violation of
Rule 1.05.38
Prior to the incorporation of Rule 1.09, former clients were well protected
from having privileged confidences later used against them; however, the
former client had few disciplinary remedies against a lawyer who improperly
switched allegiance and represented an opposing party.3 9 A primary con-
cern of the loyalty component is to protect the work done for the former
client from being later undermined by the same lawyer.40 In addition to
protecting confidences and loyalty, the rule also seeks to protect other infor-
mation given in confidence by the former client, even if not privileged.4'
tially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associ-
ated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client consents after
consultation.
MODEL R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 1.9 (1992).
36. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09(a) (1993).
37. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09(b) (1993).
38. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09(c) (1993).
39. Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 29, at 147.
40. Id. at 147-48.
41. Id. at 148.
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The prohibitions of the rule are not designed to be so broad as to totally
prohibit a lawyer from opposing the interests of a former client. 42 Also, fact
specific factors, such as the size of the law firm and scope of the former
relationship, are relevant in determining whether opposing a former client is
ethical. 43 As the purpose of the rule is for the protection of the former cli-
ent, the client may waive its protections." Finally, the strong competing
interest of an individual to have the attorney of his choice serves to lessen the
breadth of Rule 1.09. 45
III. AUTHORITY OF THE COURT
Despite the fact that an independent agency exists to determine whether
an attorney has behaved unethically, the courts may be asked to rule on a
motion for disqualification when a party believes the opposing lawyer is rep-
resenting conflicting interests. Undeniably, the court is not the proper fo-
rum for conducting disciplinary hearings or ethically sanctioning lawyers.
46
Courts do, however, have the authority over lawyers to determine whether
an attorney's appearance before them will be permitted.
47
The Texas Supreme Court has authority to make the rules governing all
persons practicing law in the state, and this power can be used to justify
disqualifications. 4 8 The Texas Supreme Court has also held that it is the
trial court's duty to be an internal regulator of the legal profession and dis-
qualify counsel when necessary.
49
Similarly, federal courts have the power to discipline and regulate attor-
neys appearing before it. 50 Authority for courts to do all that is reasonably
necessary to administer justice in their jurisdiction is derived from the inher-
ent powers doctrine. 5 1 Also, federal statute dictates that the courts have the
power to manage and conduct the cases before them.5 2 Federal courts have
used these powers to justify attorney disqualification. 53
42. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 cmt. 3 (1993).
43. Id. cmt. 2.
44. Id. cmt. 10.
45. Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 29, at 148-49. Typically courts have expressed the
importance of a client's undeniable right to obtain the attorney of his choice when invalidating
even reasonable covenants not to compete among attorneys. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Jung, 348
A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1975).
46. In Texas, the State Bar addresses those functions. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.012
(Vernon 1993).
47. See Mark F. Anderson, Motions to Disqualify Opposing Counsel, 30 WASHBURN L.J.
238, 240 (1991).
48. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 81.071 (Vernon 1993). The statute gives jurisdiction over
disciplinary matters to both the supreme court and a separate commission. Id.
49. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988). Courts are permitted to adopt rules for the conduct of
their business. Id.
51. See Anderson, supra note 47, at 240.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Field v. Freedman, 527 F. Supp. 935, 940 (D. Kan. 1981); see Anderson,
supra note 47, at 240.
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IV. THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION
MOTION
The disqualification of an attorney from representing a particular interest
in a lawsuit is neither a determination of proper conduct nor an ethical sanc-
tion.5 4 Nonetheless, courts have recognized that "[a] motion to disqualify
counsel is the proper method for a party-litigant to bring the issues of con-
flict of interest or breach of ethical 'duties to the attention of the court."
55
Courts are well aware of the implications that accompany disqualification
motions. They understand that disqualification is a harsh remedy.5 6 In fed-
eral courts, a determination of a motion to disqualify cannot be immediately
appealed. 57 Similarly, in Texas, the extraordinary writ, mandamus, is often
the only means to an immediate review.5 8 Courts also realize that a motion
to disqualify can be used as an instrument of harassment. 59 Accordingly,
disqualification as a remedy is to be used judiciously, 6° and when so used,
the motion to disqualify is an immediate, palpable remedy for preventing
harm to the movant.
The courts have confronted the issue, whether to deny consideration of a
disqualification motion as a remedy for a successive conflict in order to pre-
vent its misuse.6' The use of disqualification motions for improper purposes,
such as delay, harassment, and embarrassment, has increased in recent
years.62 Judges have frequently expressed their displeasure with such mal-
apropos conduct. 63 Courts, however, have not sacrificed the use of deter-
54. See Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 29, at 147 n.4 ("Disciplinary sanctions, which
include disbarment, suspension, reprimand, and similar penalties rendered after a quasi-crimi-
nal disciplinary hearing, are to be distinguished from procedural sanctions rendered by the
court in which a lawyer is practicing such as disqualification from handling subsequent litiga-
tion for another client."); see also Dockery, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
55. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 611 (quoting Musicus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 621
F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 398 n.50 ("A
motion to disqualify counsel is the proper procedural vehicle to challenge an attorney's
representation.").
56. Ussery v. Gray, 804 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
57. Denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney is not a final judgment subject to judicial
review. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375-78 (1981); see also Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-41 (1985) (holding that an order granting a
motion to disqualify has no immediate appeal).
58. Mandamus requires not only clear immediate harm, but also abuse of discretion by
the trial court. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985). Man-
damus will more likely issue for an order granting disqualification than a denial. J.K. & Susie
Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank v. Morris, 776 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, orig. proceeding) ("Granting a motion to disqualify sets forth at least a prima facie case
that harm has occurred .... When a motion to disqualify is denied, however, no such prima
facie case is established. Therefore ... [review of a granted motion] would generally enjoy a
rebuttable presumption that harm has in fact occurred; [review of denial] would generally
not."). Additionally, courts have recognized that remedy by appeal (after a final judgment)
can be inadequate in disqualification of counsel decisions. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d
at 400.
59. Ussery, 804 S.W.2d at 236.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 611.
62. Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in
Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227, 228 (1987).
63. Recently, when confronted with " 'dumbfoundingly voluminous pleadings' in motions
[Vol. 47
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mining a disqualification motion because of the potential for misuse.64 The
Fifth Circuit recently noted, "[o]ur prior cases disclose that a careful and
exacting application of the rules in each case will separate proper and im-
proper disqualification motions."' 65 Also, rather than disregarding the dis-
qualification motion, the court also has alternative means by which to
prevent improper motions.
66
Arguably, the best practical solution to a successive conflict is a judicial
ruling on a disqualification order. The court's authority to supervise the
attorneys practicing before it creates a duty to consider the motion.67 This
power creates an obligation for the courts to prevent any improper conduct
before them. 6s The range of conduct that a court will allow may vary by
jurisdiction,69 but the questionable conduct by the parties before it should
not proceed unchallenged.
Another pragmatic consideration justifying the motion to disqualify as a
necessary remedy to successive conflict problems is the fact that the court is
often the first place the problem arises. 70 Trial deadlines, as well as the
scholarly principles of judicial economy, mandate that a court should not
stop a trial to await the lengthy process of another agency's determination. 7
Because the disposition of the conflict could substantially undermine the
work of the trial court,72 the interests of timeliness warrant relying on the
trial court to make the initial determination of the issue in the form of
disqualification.
the attorneys filed in attempts to disqualify each other," the judge commented that "[r]arely
had the court been presented with a more blatant example of the use of disqualification mo-
tions for tactical purposes," and it was a "gross abuse of the resources of the court." Brenda
Sapino, Judge Clamps down in Airline Case: Kent Moves to Keep Big-Name Counsel in Line,
TEXAS LAW., Aug. 3, 1992, at 5.
64. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 611.
65. Id. Similarly, Texas courts expect that adhering to an exacting standard when consid-
ering motions to disqualify will prevent use of the motion as a dilatory trial tactic. NCNB Tex.
Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 399.
66. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (stating that motions must be grounded in good faith and
"not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation." [emphasis added]).
67. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376-77 (S.D. Tex. 1969); accord Sand-
ers v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 1968).
68. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 611; accord Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537
F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976). The court's duty to determine disqualification motions also
addresses its propriety in doing so. See also supra notes 45 to 52 and accompanying text.
69. Some courts operate as "ethical watchdogs" and attempt to prevent any unethical
conflicts before them. See, e.g., Matter of Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1256
(5th Cir. 1986). Other courts, more wary of purely tactical disqualification motions, will only
prevent conflicts that will serve to taint the trial. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d
433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980).
70. The adversarial nature of the judicial system especially increases the likelihood that an
attorney's representation of interests adverse to a former client will be brought first to the
attention of the court. See Dockery, supra note 5, at 726. If for no better reason than to
preserve an avenue to appeal, or just the conflict issue, any conflict will probably be noted to
the court. Id.
71. For discussion of alternatives to a motion to disqualify see infra notes 73 to 81 and
accompanying text.
72. Raising the subsequent disbarment of one's trial attorney could be an excellent argu-
ment on a motion appealing for a new trial.
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In the litigation context, the trial is where a conflict between an attorney
and former client becomes most acute, and thus the court is the most logical
place to begin addressing the ethical conflict. The judge is in an appropriate
position to be an impartial mediator. 73 Because the court already has the
litigants before it, the conflict problem can be temporarily resolved, damage
due to the impropriety can be prevented, and litigation on the merits can
continue. 74 The remedy for incorrect trial court decisions is an appeal. 75
Thus, reasonable considerations, such as ease and the probability of deter-
mining the issue properly, justify a court's determination of disqualification
motions arising from successive conflicts.76
The notice function is an additional practical reason that justifies the lib-
eral use of the motion to disqualify. The value of the notice function out-
weighs the problems associated with court determination of motions to
disqualify in conflict situations. Problems that would cause a court to dis-
qualify an attorney, or at least give consideration to the possibility, can also
form the basis for an ethical action. Typically, court proceedings are public,
and the attorneys will bring up all problems that will affect their client.77
Court action on disqualification motions can, therefore, provide notice of a
possible ethical violation to the state bar.78 Clients and attorneys rarely file
formal complaints about possible ethical violations, even when warranted.79
Thus, those responsible for investigating ethical violations might never dis-
cover situations where attorneys oppose their former clients in litigation
were a disqualification motion not presented to the court.80
Because different fundamental interests are protected in a trial than in an
ethical proceeding, the motion to disqualify is justified by the ends it pro-
tects. Although many of the factors that necessitate the existence of the
ethical rules do have a bearing on the court's disqualification decision,8' the
overriding interest of a disqualification motion "may turn on factors not in-
73. Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 29, at 153. A court in some instances may be the most
qualified in evaluating adverse effects. Id. For example, in the successive conflict context, an
attorney may be confronted with having to argue to minimize the beneficial effects of his for-
mer representation. See American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 615. A court is in a much better
position than an ethical committee to determine whether any problems will arise, and if so the
extent of conflict for the parties. Id.
74. See Developments - Conflicts, supra note 6, at 1486-96; Spickelmier & Kattner, supra
note 1, at 406.
75. The appellate court can also take into consideration any later rulings by an ethical
committee.
76. See JOHN SUTTON & JOHN DzIENKOWSKI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS 119 (1989) (stating that "The courtroom is often the
best forum for disciplining lawyers.").
77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78. Dockery, supra note 5, at 740 n.78.
79. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 611; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Law-
yers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 827-29 (1992).
80. Dockery, supra note 5, at 740 n.78; see also American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 611 ("To a
very large extent, unless a conflict is addressed by courts upon a motion for disqualification, it
may not be addressed at all.").
81. The primary goal of the ethical rule regarding an attorney's representation of interests
adverse to a former client is to protect the client. For a discussion of the aims of those rules,
especially Texas Rule 1.09, see supra notes 29 to 38 and accompanying text.
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volved in a disciplinary action by a bar committee."'8 2 Furthermore, the
disciplinary rule applies to a much broader scope of activities than just litiga-
tion, unlike the motion to disqualify.83 Since the ultimate goal of these inter-
ests differ, as well as the possible sanctions, neither forum infringes on the
other's domain; in fact, the standards do not even have to be construed
identically.8 4
Finally, as a practical matter, the motion to disqualify can procure results
that are more satisfactory to the movant than the alternatives. Without us-
ing a disqualification motion, the former client's options are turning to the
state bar for a disciplinary proceeding or instigating an action for legal mal-
practice.8 5 A disqualification motion addresses the harms of an improper
successive representation before significant damages are incurred. A suc-
cessful disciplinary prosecution punishes the offending attorney; but for the
former client, the only consolation offered is the fulfillment of any desire for
retribution and perhaps the option to make a collateral attack on the original
judgment. A malpractice action is time consuming and costly for the parties
as well as the judicial system. Also, a motion to disqualify does not foreclose
other actions; they are still available to rectify harms beyond the scope of a
disqualification motion.8 6
Justification for using the motion to disqualify in successive conflicts is
derived from the many practical needs it promotes. Courts need to hold
themselves open to solving the problems of those who come before them,
and hearing these motions can be very useful to the parties. Thus, a motion
to disqualify opposing counsel for a conflict of interest should be given thor-
ough consideration by the court to which it is submitted.
V. TREATMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS
A 1953 decision by the Southern District of New York, disqualifying an
attorney for a successive conflict, established the American precedent for
82. Ambler, supra note 2, at 5. Factors include, the integrity of the judicial process, mo-
tives of the motion, and the extent a decision will infringe upon the client's rights to counsel of
his choice. Id. at n.13. Thus the fundamental goal of a motion to disqualify is protecting the
fairness of the trial.
83. Disqualification motions typically occur in the context of litigation, while an ethical
proceeding will consider attorney behavior in any context.
84. Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 29, at 153 n.34 (stating that in regard to the standards
governing successive conflicts of interest, "[i]t would be in keeping with the [drafting] commit-
tee's thinking . . . to construe [the standard] narrowly for disciplinary purposes").
85. See Developments - Conflicts, supra note 6, at 1486-96; Dockery, supra note 5, at 740
n.79; Schneider, supra note 3, at 104. In a legal malpractice action, the former client could
request injunctive relief, the result of which would be similar to a disqualification. See, e.g.,
Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Pa. 1992). While
this approach would work well in a non-litigation context, it becomes a redundant effort when
the parties are already in an adversarial position.
86. For example, an attorney may be disqualified for inappropriately opposing a former
client, thus preventing further harm, yet a disciplinary committee may still want to consider
the attorney's ethics for accepting such a representation. See Dockery, supra note 5, at 740.
The purpose of the ethical committee is to protect the public and maintain respect for the
profession, not necessarily to protect an individual. See supra notes 45 to 52 and accompany-
ing text.
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courts to accept jurisdiction for conflict disputes.8 7 Since that time, courts
have frequently been asked to resolve successive conflict dilemmas leaving
both courts and commentators to attempt to clarify the issue. 88 Because
these motions have become the reality of today, the principles that guide a
court in its consideration of whether to disqualify should be examined.
A. HISTORY
Long ago courts established a "general and well-settled rule that an attor-
ney who has acted for one side cannot ... assume a position hostile to his
client, . . . and it makes no difference.., whether the relation itself has been
terminated, for the obligation of fidelity and loyalty still continues." 89
Although in the beginning, sanctioning from an ethics committee was the
predominant remedy for successive conflicts of interest, court orders prohib-
iting an attorney from appearing in court also became an accepted remedy. 90
The main purpose of the disqualifications was for the protection of the for-
mer client; an attorney was prohibited from representing a client against a
former client when he had knowledge or information obtained in the course
of the former relationship. 9'
In 1953, in T C. Theatre Corp.,92 the court succinctly set forth a rule to
govern a situation where an attorney should be disqualified from represent-
ing a client against a former client. 93 Concern for the protection of clients'
confidential information and the free flow of information between attorney
and client justified the rule.94 The court determined that "the former client
need show no more than that the matters embraced within the pending suit
wherein his former attorney appears on behalf of his adversary are substan-
tially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previ-
ously represented him, the former client." 95  Use of the substantial
relationship to create an irrebuttable presumption was a prophylactic mea-
87. T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 940; Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1981); NCNB Tex. Nat'! Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 399.
88. For an excellent listing of many sources of commentary see Goldberg, supra note 62,
at 229 n.13.
89. In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 952 (N.D. Cal. 1897). The court reasoned that "[an attorney]
is not allowed to divulge information and secrets imparted to him by his client or acquired
during their professional relationship ... the obligation solemnly rests upon the attorney to
keep his lips forever sealed, and to preserve inviolate the confidence reposed in him." Id. at
953.
90. See Brown v. Miller, 286 F. 994 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Weidekind v. Tuolumne County
Water Co., 19 P. 173 (Cal. 1887); Bowman v. Bowman, 55 N.E. 422 (Ind. 1899); Peirce v.
Palmer, 77 A. 201 (R.I. 1910). One court pointedly stated that it would be strange "to hold
that the proceedings ... must come to naught because of a character more favorable to the
[attorney] than might have been invoked against him." Brown, 286 F. at 997.
91. Brown, 286 F. at 997.
92. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
93. Id. at 268.
94. Id. at 269 ("No client should ever be concerned with the possible use against him in
future litigation of what he may have revealed to his attorney.").
95. Id. at 268; accord Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Wash. 1946).
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sure; proof of actual harm was irrelevant.96 Also, the test protected the cli-
ent from having to reveal any confidential material to prove its
confidentiality. 97 Thus, the magic words "substantial relationship" were
embraced by future courts who still attempt to define the parameters of the
test in their opinions.
B. THE RULE IN TEXAS COURTS
Texas, like most other jurisdictions, based determinations of disqualifica-
tion motions due to representation opposing a former client on the substan-
tial relationship precedent derived from T C Theatre Corp.98 Prior to 1989,
the rules for determining whether a substantial relationship existed were
vague, thus the determinations depended on the individual facts.99 Finally
in 1989, the Supreme Court of Texas, deciding NCNB Texas National Bank
v. Coker,t °0 considered the problem and attempted to set forth guidelines for
determining whether a substantial relationship existed.' 0 '
In Coker a Dallas law firm, Vial, Hamilton, Koch & Knox (Vial Hamil-
ton) represented NCNB in a suit against Western Fire and Walker General
(Western Fire). For a period of five months, however, Vial Hamilton had
previously represented Western Fire. Western Fire, afraid that Vial Hamil-
ton would violate the confidences and secrets gained in its earlier representa-
tion, filed a motion to disqualify Vial Hamilton as counsel for NCNB. Judge
Coker granted the motion and ordered Vial Hamilton's disqualification. 10 2
The Supreme Court accepted mandamus and took the opportunity to ex-
amine the substantive law of disqualification due to a successive conflict.
The court, finding support for its decision in principles of ethics, 10 3 reasoned
that because of the current prevalence of merging law-firms and consolidat-
ing businesses, a complete bar to any representation adverse to any former
96. Developments - Conflicts, supra note 6, at 1315-34; see In re Corn Derivatives Anti-
trust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1984).
97. TC. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 269.
98. See, e.g., P & M Elec. Co. v. Godard, 478 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. 1972) (adopting the
substantial relationship test, quoting the language of T C. Theatre Corp.).
99. Allen, supra note 11, at 746; see Gleason v. Coman, 693 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lott v. Lott, 605 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Meyerland Community Improvement Assoc. v. Temple, 700
S.W.2d 263, 267-68 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. 765 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. 1989).
101. Id. at 400.
102. Id. at 400-01. The original order of disqualification was phrased in the substantial
relationship language, which NCNB objected to because the court did not specifically identify
how the two matters were so related. Revising the order, Judge Coker omitted the substan-
tially related language altogether and stated:
The court further finds the subject matter involved in both representations are
similar enough for there to be an appearance that the attorney-client confidences
which could have been disclosed by the defendant might be relevant to the law
firm's representation of the plaintiff in this suit.
Id. at 400.
103. When this case was decided, Texas ethics were still governed by the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct were not adopted
until the following year.
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client would not be practical.10 4 The court, however, also realized that "un-
restrained representation of new clients against former clients would stifle
the attorney-client communication ... and destroy the public confidence in
the legal profession."' 0 Thus, in defining the test, the Court had to care-
fully balance the competing interests.
The Supreme Court declared that the proper test requires the showing of a
substantial relationship between the present and prior representations. 10 6
The court explained the test as follows:
The moving party must prove the existence of a prior attorney-client
relationship in which the factual matters involved were so related to the
facts in the pending litigation that it creates a genuine threat that confi-
dences revealed to his former counsel will be divulged to his present
adversary. Sustaining this burden requires evidence of specific similari-
ties capable of being recited in the disqualification order. If this burden
can be met, the moving party is entitled to a conclusive presumption
that confidences and secrets were imparted to the former attorney. 0 7
The court justified its interpretation of the substantial relation test by ex-
plaining that it is designed to benefit both the former client and the attor-
ney. 10 8 The former client is protected in that he will not have to reveal the
very confidences that were to be hidden. 10 9 If the test is met, as a matter of
law, the appearance of impropriety exists, and the attorney should be
disqualified. I10
The attorney receives protection from this statement of the rule as well.
Because of the severity of the remedy to the attorney, a preponderance of the
evidence is required to establish a substantial relationship."I' Also, the pre-
sumption that the attorney knows secrets and confidences of the former cli-
ent does not imply that the attorney revealed them." 12
After explaining the meaning of the substantial relationship test, the
Supreme Court attempted to further clarify its scope. A substantial relation-
ship requires more than a superficial resemblance between the issues; the
need for the existence of a genuine threat that confidences will be revealed
still exists." l3 When a substantial relationship is found, the precise factors
104. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 399.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 399-400. Although the Court was to refine the meaning of substantial relation-
ship, the language of T. C Theatre Corp. was retained. The court even noted that "the words
substantially related' contain no magical properties." Id. at 400.
107. Id.; see Allen, supra note 11, at 747.
108. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400.
109. Id. Although the former client does not have to reveal any confidences, he must make
more than a conclusory statement that there was a substantial relationship. Morris, 776
S.W.2d at 278 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, orig. proceeding) (citing Hydril Co. v. Multiflex, Inc.,
553 F. Supp. 552, 554-55 (S.D. Tex. 1982)); see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
110. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400.
111. Id.
112. Id. This may be of particular importance because revealing confidential information
of a former client is a basis for disciplinary action distinct from a successive conflict of interest.
See TEx. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.05 (1993) (rule entitled "Confidentiality of
Information").
113. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400; see also Morris, 776 S.W.2d at 278.
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establishing that relationship should be easy for the court to specify."t 4 The
court found that the disqualification of Vial Hamilton was an abuse of dis-
cretion and granted mandamus should Judge Coker fail to vacate the
order. 1 15
Shortly after the decision in NCNB v. Coker, however, the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility was stricken and the Texas Disciplinary Rules were
adopted. As mentioned above, Rule 1.09 not only codified the substantial
relationship test, 1 6 but expanded the prohibition of opposing former clients
to situations questioning the validity of former services or work product 117
and situations, although unrelated, that involve the risk of disclosure of con-
fidences.1 8 Because the Rules are not law which control disqualification
decisions, 19 recent case law must be examined to determine the effect, if
any, of the new ethical rules on the NCNB standard.
Of the Texas courts that have had the opportunity to consider motions to
disqualify counsel for representing interests adverse to a former client, some
have paused to consider the impact of the new Disciplinary Rules. 120 Other
courts have simply applied the test of NCNB v. Coker as wholly determina-
tive of the issue because the substantial relationship test is codified in the
rule. 12'
The decisions that have issued since the promulgation of the new Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure have applied the substantial relation test in the same
114. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400. "To hold that the two representations
were 'similar enough' to give an 'appearance' that confidences which could be disclosed 'might
be relevant' to the representations falls short of the requisites of the established substantial
relation standard." Id.; see also Morris, 776 S.W.2d at 278 (the court needs enough informa-
tion to "engage in a painstaking analysis of the facts. [A movant] must delineate with specific-
ity the subject matter, issues, and causes of action presented in former representation.").
115. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400.
116. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09(a)(3) (1993).
117. Id. at a(l).
118. Id. at a(2); see discussion of Rule 1.09 supra notes 29 to 45 and accompanying text.
119. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT preamble 15 (1993). Indeed, the Texas
Supreme Court recognizes that the Rules are not controlling, but "they have been viewed by
the courts as guidelines that articulate considerations relevant to the merits of such motions."
Spears v. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (citing Ayres v.
Canales, 790 S.W.2d 554, 556 n.2 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding)). However, a disqualification
order of an attorney restraining him from opposing a former client that failed to reference the
principles articulated in the Texas Disciplinary Rules was ruled to be an abuse of discretion.
Davis v. Stansbury, 824 S.W.2d 278, 284 (Tex. App--Houston [1st Dist] 1992, no writ).
Courts do apply the Texas Disciplinary Rules as law. See generally Conoco, Inc. v. Baskin,
803 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Wester-
gren, 794 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
One court, in its opinion, even criticized an attorney for failing to cite or mention the Texas
Rules of Disciplinary Procedure in his brief. Clarke v. Ruffino, 819 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
120. See, e.g., Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656; Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 284; Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at
949.
121. See HECI Exploration Co. v. Clajon Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Austin
1992, writ denied); Westergren 794 S.W.2d at 812; see also Central Tex. Hardware, Inc. v. First
City, 810 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (failing to
even recognize that the Texas Disciplinary Rules had replaced the Code of Professional
Responsibility).
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
manner as it was set forth in NCNB Texas National Bank. 122 Subsequent
cases have further explained the rule. In Westergren,123 the court refined the
test from NCNB Texas National Bank, dividing it into two elements crucial
to the determination of the issue of whether an attorney should be disquali-
fied for opposing a former client: (1) the existence of an attorney-client rela-
tionship between the former client and the attorney; and (2) a substantial
relationship in the factual matters of the issues.1 24
The court's decision in Westergren significantly broadened the reach of a
disqualification based on representation of an interest adverse to a former
client by expanding the reach of the attorney-client relationship. In that
case the Insurance Company of North America (INA) bonded a project for
the Braselton Construction Company (Braselton). Braselton, which was
represented by an attorney named Harris, became embroiled in litigation
over the project. In the course of the suit, Harris signed some pleadings on
behalf of INA as well as Braselton. Later, to save money for his client,
Braselton, Harris designated himself as attorney in charge for both Braselton
and INA, but withdrew as counsel for INA once disagreements arose. INA
thereafter sued Braselton, who continued to be represented by Harris. The
trial court denied INA's motion to disqualify Harris. The court of appeals,
however, granted mandamus. 125
The court first considered whether an attorney-client relation existed.' 26
The test was whether the parties had manifested an intention to create such
a relationship. 127 INA introduced the pleadings that contained Harris' sig-
nature as well as Harris' motion withdrawing as counsel for INA. Harris'
contention was that his representation of INA was purely on a pro forma
basis and that he did not even receive compensation for his representation.
The court, although it agreed the representation may have been pro
forma, found that, as a matter of law, INA had shown an attorney-client
relationship. 128 Because nothing in the Disciplinary Rules permits pro
forma representation, the court deemed the relationship sufficient to forbid a
successive representation conflict. 12 9 The court citing NCNB Texas Na-
122. HECI Exploration Co., 843 S.W.2d at 627; Westergren, 794 S.W.2d 814. However,
another case noted that it is no longer clear how the substantial relationship test should be
applied. Clarke v. Ruffino, 819 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1991, writ
dism'd w.o.j.). Despite its uncertainty, the court was able to declare that the trial judge's
finding of a substantial relationship using the NCNB rules was correct and not an abuse of
discretion. Id.; see also TEx. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 cmt. 9 (1993)
("[w]hether the 'substantial relationship' test will continue to be employed as a standard for
procedural disqualification is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules").
123. 794 S.W.2d at 814-15.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 815.
126. Id. at 814.
127. Id.; see also Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989,
writ denied).
128. Westergren, 794 S.W.2d at 815.
129. Id. Another Texas court stated that
[a]lthough there is no disciplinary rule that expressly describes when an attor-
ney-client relationship exists, the Preamble [of the Disciplinary Rules] discusses
the various functions an attorney might perform in representing clients.... One
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tional Bank, then applied the substantial relationship test, to the facts and,
finding such a relationship, ordered Harris to be disqualified.' 30 The legal
precept that attorneys can take from this case is that when involved with two
or more parties, they should limit their legal representation to their client
only. 131 More broadly, this decision can impact lawyers whose only "repre-
sentation" consisted of offhanded neighborly advice.
Other cases decided since the promulgation of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules have not altered the substance of the substantial relationship test de-
fined by NCNB Texas National Bank. 132 The ban on representing interests
adverse to a former client, however, has been expanded by other means.
While Westergren dealt with the scope of the attorney-client relationship,
other cases have expanded the reach of possible disqualifications under the
rubric of Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.09.133 Two Texas appellate courts have
delved into a consideration of the applicability of Part a(2) of the Rule 1.09,
regarding the risk of disclosure of confidential information as a basis for
disqualification.
In Clarke v. Ruffino 134 the parties, Clarke and Lehtonen, had been in-
volved in a constructive trust and fraud suit pertaining to some Texas prop-
erty. During this litigation, Lehtonen refinanced the property through an
attorney of the firm Thornton, Paine, Watson, & Kling, P.C. (Thornton
Paine). A year later, still in the course of the original litigation, Clarke ob-
tained a new attorney who was a member of Thornton Paine. Lehtonen
submitted a motion to disqualify the Thornton Paine attorney which was
granted by Judge Ruffino. 135
The court of appeals, in an original proceeding, refused to issue manda-
mus because the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by finding a substan-
tial relationship. 136 The court noted that the determination of which
successive conflicts warrant disqualification has been altered by the promul-
gation of the new Disciplinary Rules. 137 Consequently, the court found an-
other basis by which to uphold the disqualification order; disqualification
was proper because the representation could have, "in reasonable
probability, involve[d] a violation of the new rules governing confidentiality
of these functions includes evaluating a client's affairs and reporting about them
to the client or to others.
Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at 949; see TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT preamble 2 (1990).
130. Westergren, 794 S.W.2d at 815.
131. This case has the potential to expand the reach of disqualification quite considerably;
it could affect not only joint parties to litigation, but also embrace transactional counsel when
each client does not have his own attorney.
132. Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 284; Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at 949.
133. "Because of the 'or' strategically placed in this rule, there are [sic] now more than one
bases [sic] for disqualification of an attorney." Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at 950; see also TEX. DISCI-
PLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 cmt. 3 (1993) ("representation is improper if any of three
circumstances exists").
134. 819 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
135. Id. at 950.
136. Id. at 951.
137. Id. at 950.
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of information." 138
Considering the text of the rules, the court found that the new definition
of confidential information 39 is much broader than the definition under the
former Code. 140 Under the new Disciplinary Rules, confidential informa-
tion encompasses not only privileged information, but also unprivileged in-
formation which is "all information relating to a client or furnished by the
client . . . during the course of or by reason of the representation of the
client."141
The appellate court determined that Ruffino's order of disqualification
was supported by the new rules and mandamus would not issue.' 42
Although this opinion sets a precedent that disqualifications based on the
actual exchange of confidences may be used when the prior and current rep-
resentations are not substantially related, it leaves many questions unan-
swered. First, the court did not rationalize its use of the Disciplinary Rules
beyond the substantial relationship test. Use of the substantial relationship
test is supported by both policy considerations and precedent existing prior
to the new Rules.143 While application of Rule 1.09(a)(2) seems to support
similar policy goals, ' its use should be justified in light of the Rule's intent
not to be used as procedural standards.' 45
The court also left open which particular confidences will be sufficient for
a disqualification. In finding that the attorney violated Rule 1.09(a)(2), the
court simply made the conclusory statement that "[h]e had information re-
lating to [the former client] by reason of his representation of [the former
client in the earlier case]."' 46 The court did not identify what information
138. Id. at 950-51; see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09(a)(2) (1993) (us-
ing the reasonable probability language and referring to Rule 1.05).
139. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.05(a) (1992); see also Schuwerk & Sut-
ton, supra note 29, at 74-95 (explaining the differences between the new and old rules).
"Confidential information" includes both "privileged information" and "un-
privileged client information." "Privileged information" refers to the informa-
tion of a client protected by the lawyer-client privilege of Rule 503 of the Texas
Rules of Evidence or of Rule 503 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence or by
the principles of attorney-client privilege governed by Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates. "Unprivileged
client information" means all information relating to a client or furnished by the
client, other than privileged information, acquired by the lawyer during the
course of or by reason of the representation of the client.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.05(a) (1993).
140. Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at 950 (the "new definition of confidential information certainly
expands on the former definition"). Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.05(1993) with Supreme Court of Texas, Code of Prof. Responsibility DR 4-101(A) (Vernon
Supp. 1988).
141. Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at 950; see TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.05 (1993).
The former Code of Professional Responsibility protected privileged information (i.e., attor-
ney-client), secrets that the client requested remain inviolate, and information of which the
disclosure could be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. See DR 4-101(A).
142. Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at 950-51.
143. See NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400; TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CON-
DUCT 1.09 cmt. 9 (1993); Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 29, at 150.
144. See supra notes 89 to 99 and accompanying text.
145. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 cmt. 9 (1993).
146. Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at 950.
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that Thornton Paine had that could violate Rule 1.05.
Lastly, the court left no instruction on the application of 1.09(a)(2). No
indication was given of how the law-firm's possession of confidential infor-
mation constituted a representation that would, in reasonable probability in-
volve a violation of the duty of confidentiality to the former client.147 Thus,
the foundation has been laid for many future disputes on the applicability of
Rule 1.09(a)(2) to successive conflict disqualifications.
The holding in Clarke has the potential to set a precedent which would be
extremely limiting to attorneys who oppose a former client. Without the
establishment of any criteria for using Rule 1.09(a)(2) to disqualify an attor-
ney, other than the mere fact the lawyer did have confidential information in
its broadest sense, future courts could determine that possession of such in-
formation creates a presumption of a violation that merits disqualification.
Clearly, this case opens the door for disqualifications in more situations than
does the substantial relationship test.
Another recent Texas case, Davis v. Stansbury,148 interpreted the require-
ments of confidentiality in a manner that would make disqualification much
less likely than the ruling in Clarke would suggest. In Davis, the dispute was
a divorce proceeding between Suzanne Davis (Wife) and Fred Thomas Davis
(Husband). Prior to this dispute the couple had instigated divorce proceed-
ings but then reconciled. In the original divorce action Wife was represented
by Logene Foster. When the couple again decided to divorce, Husband con-
sulted Mike Orsak, a law partner of Foster and met with him twice. Orsak,
realizing that Foster was representing Wife, withdrew as counsel for Hus-
band.' 49 At the trial Husband made a motion to disqualify Orsak/Foster
from representing his wife which was granted.' 50
The majority analyzed the motion for disqualification as if Mr. Davis
sought the attorney's disqualification because Foster represented his wife,
thereby barring Orsak from representing him,' 5' rather than analyzing the
motion on the basis that Husband feared Orzak/Foster possessed confi-
dences which might be used against him. 152 The Court's holding was that
Orsak's representation of Husband would have been improper, thus Orsak
justifiably withdrew as Husband's counsel, and disqualification was
inappropriate. 53
147. The court did not construe Texas Rule 1.05 or any other duty of confidentiality in
reaching its decision.
148. 824 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, no writ).
149. Rule 1.09(b) states that other members of a firm are disqualified if any one of them
practicing alone would be. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09(b) (1993). For sim-
plicity's sake, the two attorneys can be considered as one and the same for purposes of deter-
mining what information was revealed by Husband in the course of the firm's representation of
him. Thus, hereinafter the designation Orsak/Foster will be used.
150. Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 279.
151. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.06 (1993) (rule barring concurrent
conflicts of interest).
152. For discussion of the problems with the mischaracterization of the issue see supra
notes 147 to 155 and accompanying text.
153. Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 284. The court used the substantial relationship test and Rule
1.09 to account for this determination. Id. at 281-82. However, Rule 1.06, prohibiting concur-
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The court considered the impact of Rule 1.05 on the requirements of con-
fidentiality needed to avoid disqualification.1 54 Orzak/Foster was found to
possess unprivileged confidential information about Husband, and because
the information was unprivileged, an exception to the prohibition of repre-
sentation applied.' 55 The exception allows a lawyer to reveal unprivileged
client information "[w]hen the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to
do so in order to.... respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
the lawyer's representation of the client .... ,,156 The court, relying on this
rationale, found that Wife was entitled to hear the information, and no prob-
lem existed. 15 7
The Davis application of Rule 1.05 could significantly reduce the potential
for disqualification under the Clarke analysis because only privileged client
information would give rise to confidentiality problems.158 A few difficulties
exist in the Davis analysis, however. First, the exception only authorizes
that information be revealed in order to respond to challenges to the lawyer's
representation. Thus, information may be revealed for the purpose of re-
sponding to the motion to disqualify, but not for representing the merits of
the case. Second, as the comments to the rule indicate, the authorization
varies depending on whether the disclosure is for the benefit of the client or
adverse to him. 159 When disclosure adverse to the client is permitted, it is
usually to prevent criminal or fraudulent acts.160 Because a situation involv-
ing two clients was not contemplated in drafting the rule, an intent to permit
this disclosure of client confidences is highly unlikely.
Justice Mirabal's dissenting opinion, however, is much better reasoned
and more congruent with established policy than the majority opinion. As
Mirabal points out, the court seemed to have misinterpreted the issue; thus
the precedental value of this opinion is dubious. The majority determined
the impact of disqualification from the point of view that his wife was the
former client with whom to be concerned. They did not recognize that Mr.
Davis was also a former client despite the fact that he made the motion and
the trial court's express finding that Mr. Davis had hired Orsak to represent
him.161 In fact, the court, stating the purpose of the rule, said "[t]his rule
sets forth a strong policy statement that favors a former client's right to
receive legal assistance from an attorney with whom the client had a previ-
ous attorney-client relationship."' 162
The majority cited no authority for its novel interpretation of Rule 1.09,
rent representations, would have been the proper rule to apply. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R.
PROF. CONDUCT 1.06 (1993).
154. Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 282-83.
155. Id.
156. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.05(d)(2)(iii) (1993).
157. Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 283.
158. The Davis court actually criticized Clarke for failing to distinguish between privileged
and unprivileged information and for ignoring the exception. Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 282 n.2.
159. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.05 cmts. 6-16 (1993).
160. Id. cmts. 10-14.
161. Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 284 (Mirabal, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 281.
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which contradicts a multitude of other authority that the rule is for the pro-
tection of former client confidences. 16 3 Were the court's interpretation of
the underlying policy for Rule 1.09 correct, the rule would simply forbid an
attorney to oppose a former client altogether, absent his or her consent. Ad-
ditionally, separate ethical rules explaining how an attorney may properly
decline or terminate his representation of a client could have been examined
by the majority. 164 The policy stated by the majority, if accepted, could lead
to the use of Rule 1.09 in circumstances totally unrelated to a conflict of
interest thereby expanding the application of the rule far beyond its intended
scope. 165
Had the issue, whether Orsak/Foster's former representation of Mr. Da-
vis required disqualification from representing his wife, been discussed, the
result would likely have been different. The dissent and the majority agreed
that the two lawsuits were substantially related, thus making disqualification
appropriate under Rule 1.09.166 The trial court's finding, that an attorney-
client relationship existed between Husband and the lawyers, however, could
have been challenged.
The guidelines delineating when an attorney should be disqualified for op-
posing a former client are by no means well settled in Texas. The substantial
relationship test seems to be the primary analysis, 167 but the other possible
grounds, namely Rules 1.09(a)(2) & (3) have yet to be clarified.
C. THE RULE IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
The United States Supreme Court has not yet created a uniform law for
determining when an attorney should be disqualified from representing in-
terests adverse to a former client. Not all of the circuits have identical rules,
but this comment will only consider the rules as applied in the Fifth Circuit,
with emphasis on application of Texas law.
Recently the Fifth Circuit considered motions to disqualify attorneys for
both successive conflicts 16 8 and concurrent conflicts 169 in light of the new
ethical standards. In In re American Airlines 170 Judge Higginbotham, au-
163. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 cmts. 8, 10 (1993); HECI, 843
S.W.2d at 622; Clarke, 819 S.W.2d at 950-51; Westergren, 794 S.W.2d at 815; Schuwerk &
Sutton, supra note 29, at 146-49; Allen, supra note 11, at 742-44; see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY
R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 cmt. 1 (1993) ("Rule 1.09 addresses the circumstances in which a
lawyer ... may represent a client against a former client." [emphasis added]).
164. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.15 (1993).
165. For example, this policy could be used as support for an indigent criminal defendant's
right to retain his original counsel on appeal. See Christopher D. Atwell, Professional Respon-
sibility, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1693 n.88, 89 (1993).
166. Davis, 824 S.W.2d at 284 (Mirabal, J., dissenting).
167. However, no Texas court has yet considered the effect of no longer having a rule
prohibiting the appearance of impropriety. See Supreme Court of Texas, Code of Prof. Re-
sponsibility, canon q. The present test from NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400 justi-
fied its holding, in part, on that rule.
168. In re American Airlines, Inc. 972 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1992).
169. In re Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the case discusses a
concurrent conflict of interest, much of its holding is applicable to successive conflicts, through
general discussion of how the Fifth Circuit will consider motions to disqualify in general.
170. 972 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1992).
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thor of the court's opinion, systematically re-evaluated the law regarding
disqualifications for successive conflicts of interest. The lawsuit, an antitrust
private enforcement issue between American Airlines, Northwest Airlines
and Continental Airlines, involved many of the Texas legal behemoths. At
trial, counsel for both sides tried to disqualify the opposing counsel for any
imaginable conflict. 17 1 The trial court refused to disqualify any attorneys,
but the appellate court, in an original proceeding, considered whether coun-
sel for Northwest Airlines, Vinson & Elkins, should be disqualified on the
basis of opposing American Airlines, a former client.172
American desired to disqualify the firm of Vinson & Elkins (VE) from
representing Northwest because VE was its antitrust counsel in Houston
since 1987. VE had represented American in prior antitrust suits, including
two brought by Continental, an opposing party in the instant suit. Also, VE
had advised American on antitrust issues relating to a proposed acquisition
of Continental.
The court thoroughly analyzed the law in making its ruling. Federal
courts in Texas recognize that the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure are the
applicable law. 173 However, the court expanded the basis of the applicable
law. The court said:
The Texas Rules, as adopted by the Southern District of Texas, are not
the" 'sole' authority governing a motion to disqualify." . . . [citing In re
Dresser] ... In reviewing a motion to disqualify, "we consider the mo-
tion governed by the ethical rules announced by the national profession
in light of the public interest and the litigants' rights."' 174
The court determined that the national standards as set forth by the ABA
are also applicable, ' 7 5 however, the corresponding Texas Rules are not mate-
rially different and were sufficient for a determination of the merits of a
disqualification. 176
The determination that local rules are not the sole authority governing the
motion to disqualify was rationalized by the court in finding that "[m]otions
to disqualify are substantive motions ... [in that they affect] ... the rights of
the parties," thus federal standards should apply.177 The main thrust of this
171. For discussion of the extravagance of the briefs on motions to disqualify, see Sapino,
supra note 64, at 3.
172. Some of the allegations arose from initial confusion that arose when the parties tried
to obtain counsel, and different Vinson & Elkins partners were approached by Northwest and
American. Violations of concurrent representation were not considered because the court
found disqualification necessary on other grounds. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 614.
173. For example, in the Southern District of Texas, the local rules had adopted the TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT as they are amended. TEXAS RULES OF CONDUCT, Fed-
eral App. A, Rule 4B. The Fifth Circuit recognized the TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CON-
DUCT as an amendment of the Code. See, e.g., In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 102 n.3 (5th Cir.
1992) (setting forth the corresponding local Rule for the Western District of Texas); American
Airlines, 972 F.2d at 609-10.
174. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 610 (quoting Dresser Indust., 972 F.2d at 543).
175. Id.; accord Dresser Indust., 972 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1992); Brennan's Inc. v. Bren-
nan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
176. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 610.
177. Dresser Indust., 972 F.2d at 543; accord American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 610. These
[Vol. 47
SUCCESSIVE CONFLICTS
decision was not to suggest that a motion should be argued in terms of the
public interest and the litigants' rights, but rather that national ethical prin-
ciples apply as well as the Texas Rules.'7 8
In broadening the basis of ethical principles that could control decisions,
the American Airlines court was forced to address the tests of other Cir-
cuits. 179 Ultimately the court concluded that the primary goal in the Fifth
Circuit is to prevent conflicts of interest, rather than to apply a more narrow
standard that addresses only the fairness of the trial.' 80
With the above factors in mind, the court proceeded to consider whether
the substantial relationship test, the test applied in the Fifth Circuit prior to
the promulgation of the Texas Rules,18 ' had to change under the new
rules.' 8 2 First, the court determined that the new rules do not add any new
bases for disqualification even though they prohibit successive relations for
more than just substantial relationships.' 8 3 Citing Duncan v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith 184 as authority, the court said:
The Rules are not, however, broader than the protections [for former
clients] provided by our precedents. While the focus of our cases has
been on the substantial relationship test, we have indicated that a for-
mer client could also disqualify counsel by showing that his former at-
torney possessed relevant confidential information in the manner
contemplated by Rule 1.09(a)(2).
As Duncan, for example, stated:
[The moving party may disqualify counsel on the basis of prior repre-
sentations] either by establishing that the present and previous repre-
sentations are substantially related or by pointing to specific instances
where it revealed relevant confidential information regarding its prac-
tices and procedures.18 5
Next, the court considered whether the Rules provide less protection to
former clients than precedent.'8 6 Two arguments were presented by counsel
opposing the motion to disqualify. One contention, based on a commentary
to Rule 1.09,187 was that disqualification due to a substantial relationship
cases were not diversity cases. In a diversity action or conflicts of law issue, in a jurisdiction
which uses the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the issue of whether the motion to dis-
qualify is a substantive question rather than a procedural decision may not reach the same
outcome.
178. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 610.
179. Id. For example, the Second Circuit adopted a "taint" test for determinations of dis-
qualification motions. For further discussion, see infra note 206.
180. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 610.
181. See, e.g., Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 646 F.2d 1020, 1032 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981) (applying the substantial relationship test).
182. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 (1993).
183. American Airlines, 927 F.2d at 614.
184. 646 F.2d 1020, 1032, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
185. American Airlines, 927 F.2d at 614.
186. Id.
187. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 cmt. 8 (1993) ("[S]ome courts, as a
procedural decision, disqualify a lawyer for representing a present client against a former client
when the subject matter of the present representation is so closely related to the subject matter
of the prior representation that confidences obtained from the former client might be useful in
representation of the present client.").
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should only result when there is an actual threat of revealed confidences
affecting the 'integrity of the trial.188 The court, however, denied that an
actual threat needs to be demonstrated. Instead, the former client need only
show that the two matters are substantially related.' 89
The other argument was based on the "conscious omission of the 'appear-
ance of impropriety' standard" that was contained in the Code, but not the
Rules. The court refused to sustain this contention, stating:
[W]e adhere to our precedents in refusing to reduce the concerns under-
lying the substantial relationship test to a client's interest in preserving
his confidential information. [One of the] fundamental concern[s] pro-
tected by the test is not the public interest in lawyers avoiding "even the
appearance of impropriety," but the client's interest in the loyalty of his
attorney. ' 90
The court found that loyalty, as well as confidentiality, is protected by the
Texas Disciplinary Rules that encompasses the protection of the profes-
sional's integrity.' 9' Thus, the use of the substantial relationship test as de-
fined by precedent in the Fifth Circuit was not altered by the adoption of the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
After establishing the status of the substantial relationship for attorney
disqualification, the court determined the issue of whether Vinson & Elkins'
(V&E) prior representations of American Airlines were substantially related
to the present case.192 V&E had represented American in several matters,
earning over $676,000 in legal fees. The court focused on three of V&E's
prior representations for a substantial relationship with the current matter.
In the early 1980s, Continental alleged that American's president at-
tempted to illegally monopolize the Dallas-Fort Worth International Air-
port. The court found this to be substantially related because the present
case would focus on the Dallas-Fort Worth market that was also at issue in
the first case.193 V&E disputed this finding, basing its argument on the fact
that a ten year old incident would be inadmissible as evidence. Noting that
this factor was "helpful, but not dispositive," the court said the standard is
not relevance in the evidentiary manner.194 The matter "need only be akin
to the present action in a way reasonable persons would understand as im-
portant to the issues involved."' 95 Thus, the court held this representation
188. The argument urged the adoption of the "taint of trial" standard that is used in some
circuits. This standard allows an attorney to continue representing a client absent a showing
of actual danger to the fairness of the trial.
189. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 617.
190. Id. at 616.
191. Id. at 617. Commentary to Rule 1.06 (which forbids concurrent adverse representa-
tions), provides that it is important for the lawyer to be loyal to his client. TEX. DISCIPLINARY
R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.06 cmt. 1 (1993). Also, the ABA rules prohibiting conflicts with former
clients mentions loyalty as a rationalization. MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.9 cmts. 3-10
(1983).
192. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 621.
193. Id. at 623.
194. Id.
195. Id.; accord In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir.
1981).
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to be of a substantially related matter. 196
Another antitrust action in which VE defended American involved the
use of American's CRS market. VE argued that the CRS knowledge from
the former case will not be at issue and is barred from further litigation by
res judicata. The court rejected this argument, finding that the scope of cate-
gories to be argued was not clear at the early stage of litigation when the
disqualification motions were presented. 197 In this situation, the former cli-
ent will certainly be hurt, because the attorney will attempt to minimize the
good effects of the earlier case by limiting their effect on the present case. 198
Furthermore, the court found areas that Northwest admitted would be at
issue in the present case to be substantially related to VE's prior
representation. 199
Finally, the court examined VE's representation in its capacity as Ameri-
can's antitrust advisor in the proposed Continental merger. One of the ma-
jor issues was market definition. The court found that VE, in the course of
its representation, made a detailed market evaluation and was privy to
American's views and other confidential information. 2°° Finding these mat-
ters substantially related, the court reiterated that this barred VE from at-
tempting to show that it had received no actual confidences. 20 1
In all of the instances of prior representations, the court delineated with
specificity all of the matters from the former suit which were substantially
related to the current action.20 2 The court compiled all relevant precedent
and, in conjunction with the new Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, specified precisely how a substantial relationship should be deter-
mined. Although the determination remains largely fact specific, the court's
opinion gives clarity and predictability to attorneys in determining whether a
representation adverse to a former client will be barred.
VI. THE FUTURE FOR THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
A. PROBLEMS
Despite the usefulness of disqualification motions as a remedy for an attor-
ney representing interests adverse to a former client, there are problems with
the disciplinary rules. One problem is that the rules of ethics are just that,
rules, and not law. 20 3 They were meant to be standards for disciplinary ac-
tions to be brought by an independent prosecuting agency, not as rules of
procedure for a court.2° 4 A different standard should be used when deter-
mining a disqualification motion especially since they are being urged by a
196. American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 623.
197. Id. at 624.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 625.
200. Id. at 626-27.
201. Id. at 628.
202. Id.; see Duncan, 646 F.2d at 1029.
203. James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 24 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 419 (1982).
204. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT preamble 15 (1993).
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self interested party. 20 5 Compounding that effect, opponents to the use of
the disqualification motion contend that the effect of the motion is an unjus-
tified delay to proceeding on the merits of the case. 20 6
Another concern arises from the differing objective of the ethical sanctions
as opposed to the disqualification motion. While the primary objective of
the ethical rules is the protection of the client, a disqualification motion's
main objective should be to have a fair trial for all concerned.2° 7 A related
complaint about the use of disqualification motions for successive conflict
issues is that they fail to promote loyalty, protect the integrity of the legal
profession, or protect client confidences as various jurisdictions purport. 20 8
A final problem arises from the new formulation of the disciplinary
rules. 20 9 The rules of professional conduct adopted the substantial relation-
ship test as developed through case law. 2 10 Although the same test is used,
it is interpreted differently. A disciplinary action will construe the test much
more strictly than a motion to disqualify. 211 While the standards for disqual-
ification and ethical sanctioning need to be different, this dichotomy makes
the function of attorney self-assessment rather complex. 2 12
B. CONCLUSION
At the time being, the motion to disqualify an attorney for opposing a
former client in a successive representation will be considered by the courts
in Texas. Despite the fact that the substantial relationship test has been
codified as a rule of disciplinary conduct, the application of that test to dis-
qualification motions remains virtually unchanged from its meaning before
the advent of the new rules. The ethical rules, however, may herald a
change in the Texas state courts. As Texas appellate courts have indicated,
the argument that a successive representation may in reasonable probability
violate confidences from the former representation will be considered as a
basis separate and distinct from the substantial relationship standard. The
Fifth Circuit, however, maintains that the new rules have neither added nor
subtracted from the former standard. With any luck, the rules will continue
to remain constant so the potential for a disqualification can be accurately
gauged before the need to embark on a dispute of the propriety of represen-
tation in a lawsuit.
205. Andra Greene, Everybody's Doing It - But Who Should Be? Standing to Make a
Disqualification Motion Based on an Attorney's Representation of a Client With Interests Ad-
verse to Those of a Former Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 205 (1982).
206. See Lindgren, supra note 203, at 419.
207. See John F. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57
N.C.L. REV., 497 514-16 (1979).
208. See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 264.
209. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 (19.93); MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.9
(1983).
210. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.09 (1993); MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.9
(1983).
211. See American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 615; see also Sutton & Schuwerk, supra note 29, at
153 n.34 (the drafter's idea was "to construe 'substantially related' narrowly for disciplinary
purposes." [emphasis added]).
212. Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 29, at 153.
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